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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a tool named “UV IPsec Tools”, developed to understand and interact in a didactic way with 
the transformations performed by IPsec when using the MD5, SHA-1 and 3DES algorithms for the encryption and 
integrity check of an IPv4 datagram. As an example, we present the implementation of a corporate network using 
Dynamic Multipoint Virtual Private Networks, which are based on the establishment of dynamic tunnels protected 
by IPSec. The tool was developed in Java and with the help of another program we developed, it was possible to 
validate the code for the MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms with 14 test vectors as specified in RFC 2202. Also, to show an 
application on IPsec, the design, configuration, emulation and validation of three private networks connected via the 
public Internet using GNS3 was made.
KEYWORDS: IP security, DMVPN, mGRE, ESP, AH, 3DES, SHA-1.
RESUMEN
Este artículo presenta la herramienta “IPsec Tools UV”, desarrollada para entender e interactuar de una manera didáctica 
con las transformaciones que realiza IPsec cuando usa los algoritmos MD5, SHA-1 y 3DES durante la verificación 
de integridad y cifrado de un datagrama IPv4. Como ejemplo se presenta la implementación de una red corporativa 
usando Redes Privadas Virtuales Dinámicas Multipunto, las cuales se basan en el establecimiento de túneles dinámicos 
protegidos por IPsec. La herramienta fue desarrollada en Java y con el apoyo de otro programa desarrollado fue posible 
validar el código de los algoritmos MD5 y SHA-1 con 14 vectores de prueba especificados en la RFC 2202. Además, 
para mostrar una aplicación de IPsec, se hizo el diseño, configuración, emulación y validación de tres redes privadas 
conectadas a través de la Internet pública utilizando el software de emulación GNS3.
PALABRAS CLAVE: IP security, DMVPN, mGRE, ESP, AH, 3DES, SHA-1.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) is configured 
to provide integrity checks using either the AH 
(Authentication Header) or ESP (Encapsulating 
Security Payload) protocol [1], the HMAC (Hashed 
Message Authentication Code) algorithms that are 
commonly available in most computer networks are 
MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5) and SHA-1 (Secure 
Hash Standard version 1). Despite the superiority of 
SHA-1 over MD5, recent research suggests that it will 
require only 252 operations to undermine the resistance 
to collisions of SHA-1 [2]. This suggests that in the 
short or medium term a transition will be necessary 
from SHA-1 to an algorithm more resistant to collisions, 
such as SHA-2. Currently, there are several applications 
based on SHA-1 signatures that enjoy widespread 
popularity and acceptance: the Digital Signature 
Algorithm, the message format OpenPGP (Open Pretty 
Good Privacy) defined in RFC 4880 [3], the concept of 
Trust in the Web in systems compatible with OpenPGP, 
and the IPsec protocol. Additionally, in the router 
configuration, the options for encryption algorithms that 
can be used for the ESP protocol are 3DES (Triple Data 
Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard). Similarly, the authentication between two 
routers in phase 1 of IKE (Internet Key Exchange) can 
be configured so that they make use of shared keys or so 
that it is based on RSA´s  (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) 
public key algorithm.
When trying to observe the IP datagrams protected by 
IPsec with a packet sniffer tool such as Wireshark, it is 
only possible to interpret the datagram fields that have 
not been encrypted [4]. To understand and interact with 
the IPsec processing performed by the MD5, SHA-1 
and 3DES algorithms, a tool called “IPsec Tools UV” 
was developed. With this tool, it is possible to type in 
the header fields in the original IP datagram, define 
integrity checking algorithms with their respective 
HMAC keys, specify the key and initialization vector 
for the 3DES algorithm, define the operation mode of 
IPsec as tunnel or transport, specify the destination IP 
address to the IPsec tunnel, complete the IP datagram 
payload field, obtain the hexadecimal data for integrity 
checking and encryption of the original datagram and 
retrieve clear text (as a hexadecimal string) of the 
original IP datagram with the information added by 
IPsec before encryption. The “IPsec Tools UV” tool was 
developed in the absence of any tool that provides the 
above functions. It requires no prior knowledge of the 
keys to decipher the fields of the IP datagrams, and also 
it is of public use and portable. The tool was developed 
in Java and the following aspects were considered in 
the design of it: ease of use, portability, provides default 
values in user fields, and the ability to validate MD5 
and SHA-1 algorithms. Tools like NIIST (NIST IPsec 
and IKE Simulation Tool) [5] have a different scope 
because they are designed mainly to evaluate and 
investigate IPsec performance in large-scale virtual 
private network environments, with emphasis on IKE
As an IPsec application, we test the emulated company’s 
private networks interconnected via the Internet with 
proper protection  provided by IPsec [6]. The most 
commonly used topology is called Hub-Spoke, which 
uses a tunnel to connect each remote router to the 
central router. One disadvantage of this configuration 
is that when the communication takes place between 
two remote offices, information must pass through the 
central site, precluding the use of the best available 
route on the Internet between the two remote sites, 
which may be critical for delay-sensitive applications 
such as VoIP (Voice over IP). Another disadvantage 
is related to configuration management: for each new 
remote router, some additional lines in the central  router 
must be configured. To overcome these restrictions and 
provide a solution to the problem of scaling, a design 
concept known as DMVPN (Dynamic Multipoint 
Virtual Private Network) can be exploited, using a 
single multipoint tunnel called mGRE (Multipoint 
Generic Routing Encapsulation) [7; 8] superimposed 
over the Internet and with their end points protected 
by IPsec. The configuration of the tunnel makes use of 
NHRP (Next Hop Resolution Protocol) [9]. Of course, 
when attempting to deploy this technology directly in 
the field without the necessary experience and control 
logistics, too much time can be wasted before success. 
For this reason, it is desirable to emulate in a controlled 
environment the network setup, validate and tune the 
design and identify the tasks to be carried out in the 
field. This can be accomplished using physical routers 
or emulation tools such as Dynamics under the GUI 
provided by GNS3 [10]; We choose the latter option. 
This allows considering the GNS3 emulation as a useful 
option for ISPs when they require exploring prior to 
actual IPsec Implementation.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Basic IPSEC algorithms: integrity 
verification and encryption
The development of the “IPsec Tools UV” tool was 
done using the Java programming language because 
it provides high-level programming and has libraries 
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and APIs that incorporate security algorithms such as 
MD5, SHA-1 and 3DES. This tool allows to analyze 
the transforms that occur in an IP datagram when this 
is processed at the end of an IPsec tunnel, it provides 
a basic interactivity interface with an integrity 
verification function for SHA-1 or MD5 algorithms 
and encryption function for the 3DES algorithm; such 
algorithms are used for the protection of IP datagrams. 
Figure 1 shows a block diagram representing the logic 
structure of the “IPsec Tools UV” tool. A user can use 
the tool in three steps. In the first step, the user manages 
the configuration information related with the integrity 
verification algorithm and encryption algorithm on the 
“Configure Encryption” Tab. In the second step, the 
user fills in 11 fields of the IP datagram header and the 
“IP destination router” field on the “Header IP” Tab. In 
the third step, the user can type a string of hexadecimal 
values representing the payload of the IP datagram and 
display the results of the integrity check and encryption 
of IPsec on the “Results” Tab. Using this Tab, the user 
can also decrypt the previously encrypted IP datagram.
Figure 1. Structure logic of “IPsec Tools UV” tool
2.2 Design of a dynamic multipoint virtual 
private network
The strategy for validating a network’s ability to 
establish dynamic tunnels on the Internet under DMVPN 
was conducted in three steps. The first step was to 
undertake a network design taking into account the user 
needs in terms of requirements for public and private IP 
addresses. The second step was to connect and configure 
four routers that represent a sample of the user´s network, 
including a router that represented the Internet. Finally, 
the results were observed and documented in order to 
adjust them and apply them in practice.
Figure 2 shows the design of a network that uses DMVPN 
as a direct application of IPsec. The network is made up 
of four routers, the router whose name is R4-Internet 
emulates the Internet, its functions can be performed by 
any Layer 3 switch. The R4-Internet router knows only 
about the existence of three public IP networks directly 
connected to it whose addresses are: 12.34.56.0/24, 
23.45.67.0/24 and 34.56.78.0./24. The R1 router assumes 
the role referred to as “Hub router”, this is connected to 
the LAN1 private network (192.168.1.0/24) and has a 
connection to the Internet. The R2 and R3 routers have a 
role referred to as “Spoke router”, these are connected to 
the LAN2 private network (192.168.2.0/24) and LAN3 
private network (192.168.3.0/24), respectively. Both 
have Internet connections. Also, in relation to routers R1, 
R2 and R3, it is important to verify first if their operating 
systems have DMVPN operation capabilities. In practice, 
the LAN1 network could represent the main headquarters 
network of a corporation while the LAN2 network and 
LAN3 network could represent two branches of the same 
corporation.
In a conventional topology of type “Hub-spoke”, the 
connection of each remote network with the central 
network is done by setting a static tunnel between the 
central router and each of the remote routers. Accordingly, 
each new remote network will require additional 
configuration lines in the central router. Additionally, 
the voice and data traffic between two remote sites must 
go through the first tunnel between one of the remote 
sites and the central router, and immediately such traffic 
should enter into a second tunnel that will lead to the 
network of the destination remote site. Although the Hub-
spoke topology is an acceptable solution which allows 
internetworking of private networks via the Internet, 
it can have drawbacks with scaling in more complex 
situations or when it is used for applications between two 
remote sites which demand the lowest possible delay.
Figure 3 shows a mGRE tunnel overlaying the Internet, 
as if it were a new IP logic multipoint network. In this 
network there are three interfaces that receive the 
assignment of IP addresses within the 192.168.0.0/24 
range. To differentiate the IP addresses assigned to the 
logical interfaces that belong to the multipoint tunnel 
(192.168.0.1/24, 192.168.0.2/24 and 192.168.0.3/24) 
from the IP addresses assigned to physical interfaces 
connected to the Internet, the latter are called “physical 
addresses” since they correspond to physical interfaces 
in the routers. As can be appreciated, a mGRE tunnel 
allows to have more than two network interfaces and 
it can be treated primarily as a multi-access network 
without broadcast support. Such networks are also called 
type NBMA networks (non-broadcast multi-access).
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Figure 2. Three Local Area Networks with connection to Internet
Figure 3. A mGRE tunnel overlaying the Internet
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2.3 Dynamic multipoint virtual private network 
configuration 
The R4-Internet router in this example represents the 
Internet. The R1, R2 and R3 routers have some of their 
interfaces configured with public IP addresses, as if 
they were connected to the Internet. Other interfaces 
of the R1, R2 and R3 routers are configured with 
the private IP addresses of their respective local area 
subnetworks. Each of these routers has the IP address 
of the next hop that allows an Internet connection as 
their default gateway (the nearest IP address to the R4-
Internet router). For example, R1 has as default gateway 
12.34.56.1. 
In the operation of DMVPN, R1 has the role of NHS 
(Next Hop Server). The following command lines allow 
to configure DMVPN [11] at R1:
  1. interface Tunnel0 
  2. ip address 192.168.0.1 255.255.255.0
  3. ip nhrp map multicast dynamic
  4. ip nhrp network-id 1
  5. tunnel source 12.34.56.2
  6. tunnel mode gre multipoint
In the above lines, it can be seen that the tunnel, 
configured to operate in multipoint GRE mode, does not 
have an explicit destination IP address. This is because 
the multipoint tunnels are created in a dynamic way, as 
initiated from the remote routers to the central router, 
thereby avoiding the need to configure the addresses 
of the remote routers in the central router. The line 4 
“ip nhrp network-id 1” uniquely identifies the DMVPN 
network and avoids the formation of tunnels with 
routers that have different identifiers. The line 3 “ip nhrp 
map multicast dynamic” allows forwarding of multicast 
traffic through the tunnel to the remote routers, which 
is required by most routing protocols. Configuration 
of remote routers is very similar to that of R1. In the 
configuration of R2 that is presented below, there are 
two new commands: line 12 “ip nhrp nhs 192.168.0.1” 
designating the IP address of the interface tunnel of R1 
as the next hop server and line 9 “ip nhrp map 192.168 
.0.1 12.34.56.2 “ making a static association of the IP 
address of the next hop server with the IP address of the 
physical interface of R1. Finally, line 10 “ip nhrp map 
multicast 12.34.56.2” allows multicast traffic only from 
the remote router to the central router and not between 
remote routers.
  7. interface Tunnel0
  8. ip address 192.168.0.2 255.255.255.0
  9. ip nhrp map 192.168.0.1 12.34.56.2
10. ip nhrp map multicast 12.34.56.2
11. ip nhrp network-id 1
12. ip nhrp nhs 192.168.0.1
13. tunnel source 23.45.67.2
14. tunnel mode gre multipoint
2.4 Routing protocols and security configuration
Since the mGRE tunnel behaves like an NBMA 
multipoint network which functions to interconnect 
private subnets LAN1, LAN2 and LAN3, a dynamic 
routing protocol must be enabled to allow automatic 
exchange of routing information to make each router 
known directly. In this case we have chosen the 
protocol OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) due to its high 
scalability. To ensure optimal operation such that traffic 
exchanged between routers R2 and R3 does not have to 
go through R1, the DMVPN cloud should be treated as 
if it were a broadcast network like Ethernet. In this way, 
when the central router reflects the routes, the next hop 
IP address value obtained by the remote routers is the 
address best suited for communication between them. 
Therefore, the R1 tunnel interface must be configured in 
broadcast mode (line 18 “ip ospf network broadcast”). 
The OSPF priorities are set to ensure that the central 
router is always the DR (Designated Router) and that 
the remote routers are not elected as DR or BDRS 
(Backup Designated Router). This means that only the 
central router should be able to generate and replicate 
multicast IP datagrams to all remote routers. The only 
difference between configuring OSPF on R2 and R3 
compared to configuring OSPF on R1, is that for R2 
and R3 the OSPF priority is set to zero (with “ip ospf 
priority 0”). The configuration lines for R1 are shown 
below.
15. router ospf 1
16. network 192.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 area 0
17. interface Tunnel0
18. ip ospf network broadcast
19. ip ospf priority 10
Since multipoint tunnels use an infrastructure without 
security guarantees like the Internet, their protection 
must be enabled through IPsec. In general, to activate 
IPsec protection four configuration steps that are 
related should be carried out as explained briefly in 
the following. The first step is to define an ISAKMP 
(Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol) policy for authentication. This has the goal of 
selecting the authentication mode (shared key or public 
key), encryption algorithm, integrity check algorithm, 
with parties agreeing on the parameters to use in the 
authentication phase (lines 20 to 23). In the second 
step, a set of transforms is created which define the 
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encryption protocol (ESP) and its associated algorithms 
(3DES, AES), as well as the integrity check protocol 
(ESP or AH) and its associated algorithms (SHA-1 , 
MD5) (line 25). In the third step, the set of transforms 
(defined above) is associated to a profile identified by a 
name (lines 27 to 28). Finally, the profile name is applied 
to the tunnel interface to be protected (lines 30 to 31). 
Below are the configuration lines that enable protection 
of the R1 tunnel interface using IPsec. Configuration 
of R2 and R3 is similar to R1, except for the physical 
interface addresses to which each configuration line 
(“crypto isakmp key Pa8sw0rd address”) must refer to 
according to the router which is to be configured.
20. crypto isakmp policy 10
21. authentication pre-share
22. crypto isakmp key Pa8sw0rd address 23.45.67.2 
255.255.255.0
23. crypto isakmp key Pa8sw0rd address 34.56.78.2 
255.255.255.0
24. !
25. crypto ipsec transform-set MisTransformadas esp-
3des esp-sha-hmac 
26. !
27. crypto ipsec profile MiPerfil
28. set transform-set MisTransformadas
29. !
30. interface Tunnel0
31. tunnel protection ipsec profile MiPerfil
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Integrity check
Figure 4 shows the validation program (IPsec 
IntegrityCheck) which has a similar code to “IPsec 
Tools UV” for the algorithms MD5 and SHA-1. IPsec 
IntegrityCheck allows to validate the MD5 and SHA-1 
algorithms using the 14 test vectors specified by RFC 
2202 [12]. These vectors cannot be introduced directly 
into the “IPsec Tools UV” tool because it has been 
assumed that the IP version and header length fields 
have fixed values and therefore by design are protected 
for editing with their default values . The graphical 
interface of the validation program allows to select the 
integrity algorithm using radial circles for MD5 or SHA-
1. The selected integrity verification function is applied 
to the message entered in the upper field using the key 
that has been entered in the lower field. For the standard 
test number 1 SHA-1 enters the text “Hi There” in the 
upper field and the string “0x0b0b ... 0b0b” (20 times 
hex number 0b) in the lower field. Finally, after clicking 
the “Compute” button, the message verification code 
is obtained, which for the standard test for number 1 
begins with “B617” and ends with “be00”. The resulting 
integrity check code (also called message digest or 
hash) has a length of 160 bits when using the SHA-1 
algorithm and 128 bits when using the MD5 algorithm. 
The length of the code is independent of the length of 
the message to protect and the length of the key used.
Figure 4. Validation program for the algorithms MD5 and 
SHA-1
3.2 IPsec TOOLS UV TOOL
From the variety of configuration options for 
authentication, integrity and privacy available in IPsec, 
the subset MD5, SHA-1 and 3DES was chosen to be 
implemented in IPsec Tools UV.
Figure 5 shows the IP Header Tab used to enter values 
in all header fields of an IP datagram, except in the 
fields “IP version” (which defaults to 4) and HLEN 
(header length, default value is 5). All these fields 
are used to form both the outer header (tunnel mode) 
and the inner datagram header protected by IPsec. In 
general, the “Protocol” field identifies the upper level 
protocol payload that is carried by an IP datagram. 
In particular, when an IP datagram is protected using 
IPsec, the “Protocol” field codes AH with 51 and ESP 
with 50. Using the HEC button the verification of IP 
header (Header Checksum field) is obtained, which in 
this example is “E758”. The program verifies that the 
“IP destination router” field is activated only if the 
operation of IPsec in tunnel mode has been configured 
via the “Configure Encryption” Tab. When this option 
is activated, the source and destination IP addresses 
header for both ends of the tunnel are added. When 
forming the protected IPsec datagram, the program 
uses the value entered in the Source IP Address field 
(192.168.0.1) as the tunnel source IP address and takes 
the value of the address entered in the IP destination 
router field as the destination IP address of the tunnel 
(192.168.0.3).
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Figure 5. IP Header Tab
Figure 6 shows the “Configure Encryption” Tab to set 
up the encryption key that will be used by the encryption 
algorithm (3DES) used by “IPsec Tools UV”. The 
minimum size of this key is 24 characters. The 64-
bit initialization vector can be randomly generated or 
entered manually. Finally, the operation mode for IPsec 
“Transport” or “Tunnel” mode can be set.
Figure 6. Configure Encryption Tab
The “Payload” field (see Figure 7) allows the payload 
value of the plain IP datagram to be entered in 
hexadecimal. By clicking on the “Compute HMAC” 
button, the integrity check code covering the IP 
datagram payload and IP datagram header fields that 
do not change is obtained. The verification code has 
a size of 160 bits (20 bytes) for SHA-1 and 128 bits 
(16 bytes) for MD5. To encrypt and decrypt the IP 
datagram, the “Encryption” and “Decryption” buttons 
are used respectively. In the lower left box labeled 
“Datagram encryption”, after the field that represents 
the destination address of the tunnel “C0A80003” 
(192.168.0.3) appears the code generated by the HMAC 
SHA-1 algorithm, which for this example is the hex 
string “C5F7073C C9F9AB98 9DF02FCF 49E535B0 
33875B8E”. Then there follows the string with a 
length of 32 bytes “47C33033 79CE944A E06296C1 
DA8DF5F7 258C706D F7FF6B77 7322BCB8 
22BCA205”, which are the values generated by the 
3DES encryption algorithm, these values represent the 
encryption of the 20 bytes of internal header from the IP 
datagram “45000014 D20A0000 8033E758 C0A80001 
C0A80002” and of the four octets of payload carried 
by the datagram “AB1234AB” (these two strings of 
24 bytes are displayed in plain text to the right, below 
the “Datagram decryption” heading). The above results 
demonstrated that each of the fields in the IP datagram 
are encrypted and decrypted, emulating the process that 
performs the IPsec protocol. For example, the inner 
header of the IP datagram is encrypted using the 3DES 
algorithm and the integrity of the datagram is achieved 
using either SHA-1 or MD5. With an upgrade of the 
tool, these transformations are feasible on protocols 
such as IPv6. Results on [13] indicate that IPsec 
performance can be improved to be used in smart grids 
through ESP+, in that sense, the  tool “IPsec Tools UV” 
could be adapted to display the new transformations 
performed by the ESP + protocol.
Figure 7. Tool “IPsec Tools UV” with some of the key 
functions of IPsec
3.3 Virtual private network dynamic multipoint: 
verification of operation
One of the main advantages of designing a network 
infrastructure based on the DMVPN concept is the 
ability to establish tunnels between remote routers, 
both dynamically and directly. In our example, after 
establishing the tunnel configuration on each router, it 
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can be verified that the R2 router is able to establish 
two DMVPN sessions: a static session with the R1 
central router and a dynamic session with the R3 remote 
router which is activated when traffic is generated from 
R2 to R3. Table 1 shows the result when running the 
command “show dmvpn” in R2, which shows that a 
packet originating in LAN2 and destined for LAN3 
does not have to go through R1 to reach R3 (i.e. it 
travels by the optimal path).
After applying IPsec protection to the mGRE tunnel, 
the command “show crypto isakmp sa” in R2 displays 
the IKE security associations that have been established 
and the command “show crypto ipsec sa” shows the 
number of packets encrypted and decrypted through 
each tunnel. The command “show ip route” in turn 
shows the routing table with the networks known by 
each router. Table 2 shows the R2 routing table. In 
Table 2, the penultimate entry indicates that the next 
hop to reach the 192.168.3.0/24 network has IP address 
192.168.0.3, that is from R2 it is possible to go directly 
to LAN3 without any involvement of R1. These results 
have been obtained in a fully controlled environment.
4. CONCLUSIONS
IPsec is a comprehensive security architecture [14] 
aimed at protecting IP datagrams across a public 
network. This architecture allows combining multiple 
options in terms of security: different levels of 
protection for IP datagrams using AH (integrity check) 
or ESP (integrity check and/or encryption), different 
modes of operation (transport or tunnel), and a set of 
algorithms to implement the respective transformations 
(MD5, SHA-1, 3DES, AES). The “IPsec Tools UV” tool 
facilitates the exploration of the main transformations 
as it allows to type data in the header fields and payload 
field of an IP datagram, choose the operation mode 
of IPsec, select the integrity check algorithms and 
perform transformations by MD5, SHA-1 and 3DES. 
By developing this kind of tool, we hope to have made a 
contribution to education on the understanding and best 
provisioning of data networks in our country.  A future 
work could be to include IPv6 fields, newer security 
algorithms and higher level protocols; like Secure 
Socket Layer.
In this article, it has been shown that it is possible to 
interconnect private networks in a secure way over 
the Internet using the appropriate tools and protocols. 
The design approach, which uses dynamic multipoint 
tunnels based on mGRE protected by IPsec, offers the 
benefit of expedited communication through direct 
tunnels established between remote sites involving the 
exchange of IP datagrams. Using mGRE also eases the 
configuration of the central router when it is necessary 
to increase the number of remote sites as the design can 
incorporate the OSPF protocol as a routing protocol 
when it is desired to exploit its high scalability. 
Table 1. DMVPN sessions provided by the R2 router
Table 2. R2 routing table
Tunnel0, Type:Spoke, NHRP Peers:2
# Entry Peer Address NBMA
Peer Tunnel 
Address State UpDown Time Attribute
1 12.34.56.2 192.168.0.1 Up 02:16:55 S
2 34.56.78.2 192.168.0.3 Up Never D
Protocol : C - connected, S* – Static, O – OSPF
23.0.0.0/24 is subnetted, 1 subnets
C 23.45.67.0 is directly connected, serial 1/0
C 192.168.0.0/24 is directly connected, Tunnel0
O 192.168.1.0/24 [110/11121] via 192.168.0.1, 00:18:55, Tunnel0
C 192.168.2.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0
O 192.168.3.0/24 [110/11121] via 192.168.0.3, 00:17:59, Tunnel0
S* 0.0.0.0/0 24 [1/0] via 23.45.67.1
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Before attempting a direct deployment of a relatively 
complex network based on mGRE and bringing it into 
production, the option of developing a prototype of the 
network using a few routers or using emulation software 
such as Dynamips or GNS3 should be considered. 
During the process of making the prototype operational, 
the protocols that are most suited in terms of operation, 
security and scalability can be identified. The critical 
parameters that must be taken into account for final 
deployment can also be defined. According to this 
approach, sufficient experience is gained by tackling 
the keys issues involved in the final deployment of the 
network. 
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